Russia's Recent Deatings with the Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights by Henderson, Jane Elisabeth
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Henderson, J. E. (Accepted/In press). Russia's Recent Deatings with the Council of Europe and European Court
of Human Rights. EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW, 24(3).
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
Russia’s Recent Dealings with the Council of Europe and 
European Court of Human Rights 
Jane HENDERSON 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Russia has barely been out of the news since the last Rapport in 2015. In selecting which 
topic to highlight here, I decided to focus on recent aspects of Russia’s relationship with the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), because these have 
extraterritorial implications.1 
 
2 RUSSIA JOINS THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND ACCEDES TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (ECHR) 
 
Our story begins in the 1990s. Russia applied in May 1992 to join the CoE.2 Detailed 
membership criteria were specified and agreed to, and in February 1996, despite some 
misgivings expressed about her suitability,3 Russia was accepted. The Russian legislature 
ratified the ECHR on 30 March 1998, going into force in 1 November 1998. This gave 
individual Russians the right to petition the ECtHR in Strasbourg, provided local remedies 
had been exhausted. The Russian Constitution adopted in December 1993 had made 
provision for this by enshrining in Article 46(3) that ‘Each shall have the right in accordance 
with international treaties of the Russian Federation to apply to inter-State agencies for the 
defence of the rights and freedoms of man if all available intra-State means of legal defence 
have been exhausted.’4 Importantly for our story, the Constitution also determined in Article 
15(4) that 
 
                                                     
 Senior Lecturer in the Laws of Eastern Europe, King’s College London, The Dickson Poon School of Law. 
1 Very many thanks to Professor Bill Bowring for helpful suggestions and references. Any errors remain the 
author’s. 
2 P. Jordan, ‘Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe in Compliance with European Human Rights Norms’  
Demokratizatsiya 11, no. 2 (2003): 281-96, at 284 available at 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/11-2_Jordan.PDF. See also detailed 
discussions in B. Bowring, ‘Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights: Compliance or 
Cross-Purposes?’, European Human Rights Law Review 6 (1997): 628-643; B. Bowring, ‘Russia’s Accession to 
the Council of Europe: Four Years on’ European Human Rights Law Review 4 (2000): 362-79. 
3 See Jordan supra n. 2 at 285. 
4 English translation of the Constitution in W. Butler, Russian Public Law, 3rd edn (London: Wildy, Simmonds 
& Hill, 2013) 4-32, at p.11. 
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Generally-recognised principles and norms of international law and international 
treaties of the Russian Federation shall be an integral part of its legal system. If other 
rules have been established by an international treaty of the Russian Federation than 
provided for by law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.5  
 
Both articles are in entrenched chapters which cannot be amended by the Russian legislature, 
but might only be changed through a Constitutional Convention, for which currently the 
requisite Federal Constitutional Law (FCL) has not yet been adopted.6  
Russia’s decision to join the CoE had a wealth of consequences beyond acceding to 
ECtHR jurisdiction: for example, it also necessitated a ‘demilitarisation’ of the whole 
penitentiary system, shifting it from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry 
of Justice, major changes to criminal procedure and removal of the death penalty.7 The 
required reforms were no small feat. In a speech given at King’s College London in 2002, the 
then Deputy Minister of Justice (who had previously been Head of the Russian Prison 
Administration) Iuri Kalinin stated that, ‘In the five years after Russia joined the Council of 
Europe, more than 2,300 Federal Laws were passed, both new ones and amendments as well 
as additions to previously existing laws.’8 And that did not cover everything; effective 
abolition of the death penalty has been achieved through CCRF rulings rather than 
amendment of the Criminal Code.9 
Since accession, Russia’s relationship with both the CoE and the ECtHR has not been 
smooth. This brief Rapport will not attempt to catalogue all the various difficulties, but will 
concentrate on some significant recent developments.  
 
3  DISPUTES ABOUT SUBSIDIARITY 
                                                     
5 Ibid. in W. Butler, Russian Public Law, 3rd edn (London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2013) 4-32, at 7. 
6 Further details on Federal Constitutional Laws in J. Henderson, The Constitution of the Russian Federation 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at p.81, 174–6. 
7 See discussions in Bowring (2000) supra n. 2. 
8 Iu. Kalinin, ‘The Russian Penal System: past, Present and Future’, p.9 available at 
http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/kalinin_russian_penal_system.pdf.  
9 The 1996 Criminal Code has five crimes for which the death penalty is available. The CCRF ruled in February 
1999 that until jury trial was available throughout Russia, the death penalty could not be applied. In November 
2009 the Supreme Court requested clarification from the CCRF as to whether the death penalty would be 
reinstated once jury trial was generally available, as the last region – the Chechen Republic – would get juries 
from 1 January 2010. The CCRF ruled that the death penalty moratorium would be extended indefinitely. See, 
‘The Abolition of the Death Penalty and Its Alternative Sanction in Eastern Europe: Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine’ 26-8 (Penal Reform International 2012) available at https://www.penalreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Eastern-European-research-Death-Penalty-Alternative-Sanctions-ENGLISH-March-
2012.pdf.  
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On 15 December 2015 amendments to the FCL on the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation (CCRF)10 came into force which gave the CCRF a significant, but very imprecise, 
power.11 Under revised Article 3(3-2) the CCRF: 
 
on the application of a federal agency of state power… when considering complaints 
against the Russian Federation in an interstate agency for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of man on the basis of an international treaty of the Russian Federation 
decides the issue of the possibility [vozmozhnost’] of implementing the decision of the 
international agency.12 
 
The meaning of ‘possibility’ in this context was not defined. Two mechanisms are established 
for appealing to the CCRF such an interstate agency decision. An appeal can be brought by 
Russian federal agency responsible for handling the nation’s interests in international court 
cases; alternatively, the President or Russian government can appeal.13 Bowring notes that 
‘the State Duma’s own lawyers had expressed concerns as to the legality of the 
amendments’14 in the light of Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution (cited above), the 
1998 federal law ratifying the ECHR, and a binding Ruling of the Russian Supreme Court’s 
Plenum of 27 June 2013 on how to apply the ECHR. Bowring also points out that CoE 
Secretary General, Thorbjørn Jagland, was more measured than some others commenting on 
the new provision; he expressed willingness to wait and see how the CCRF used its power in 
a specific case.15 
                                                     
10 Federalnyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 14 Dekabria 2015 N 7-FKZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi 
konstitutionnyi zakon “O Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’ available at 
https://www.rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html.  
11 For a thorough and nuanced analysis see B. Bowring, ‘Russian cases in the ECtHR and the question of 
implementation’ 188-221 in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect (L. 
Mälksoo & W. Benedek eds., Cambridge University Press 2017). A preview of a draft version of this chapter 
was of enormous assistance for this section of the Rapport.  
12 Author’s translation of text of law supra n. 10. 
13 ‘Russian Duma Allows Constitutional Court to Override International Court Orders’ The Moscow Times 4 
Dec. 2015 available at https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian- Duma-allows-constitutional-court-to-
override-international-court-orders-51090.  
14 Supra n. 11, citing A Pushkarskaya, ‘ Duma staff lawyers have criticised the amendments to the law on the 
CC on the conditions of non-implementation of the decisions of the ECtHR’ Kommersant 1 Dec. 2015 available 
at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2866415.  
15 Bowring supra n. 11, citing https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2015/-
/asset_publisher/9k8wkRrYhB8C/content/russia-s-new-law-on-the-constitutional-court-jagland-a-solution-
should-be-possible-.  
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The CCRF gave its first judgment in such a case in April 2016.16 The issue was the 
possibility of implementing the ECtHR judgment of 4 July 2013 in the case of Anchugov and 
Gladkov v. Russia17 condemning a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting rights (aptly 
characterised by Bowring as ‘the Russian Hirst v UK’).18 Russia has a particular problem 
with the adverse judgment as the Russian Constitution specifically stipulates in Article 32(3) 
that ‘Citizens deemed by a court to lack dispositive legal capacity, and also maintained in 
places of deprivation of freedom by judgment of a court, shall not have the right to elect and 
to be elected.’19 As with the Article quoted in section 2 above,20 this article is in one of the 
entrenched chapters, so that arguably to change Russian law to take into account the 2013 
ECtHR judgment condemning the blanket ban would be inconsistent with the Russian 
Constitution. Indeed on 15 June 2015 a group of deputies from the Russian State Duma took 
a case to the CCRF to get a ruling on the constitutionality of, inter alia, Article 1 of the 1998 
Law on Ratification of the ECHR, on the grounds that it ‘obliged Russian organs of 
legislative, executive and judicial power, to unconditionally implement judgments of the 
ECtHR, even in cases where such judgments contradicted the Constitution’.21 On 14 July 
2015 the CCRF issued a resolution (postanovlenie) that the legislation in question was 
compatible with the Constitution.22 However, as Bowring presciently phrases it, the CCRF 
‘laid the basis’ for the amending law set out at the beginning of this section, by suggesting 
that the Court might review in a concrete case the issue of incompatibility with the Russian 
Constitution of a ECtHR judgment. 
In March 2016, the CoE’s European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
usually known as the Venice Commission,23 published its Interim Opinion on the 
amendments to the FCL on the CCRF.24 The Final Opinion followed in June.25 Paragraph 4 
of its Introduction explained that: 
                                                     
16 No. 12- П/2016, 19 April 2016. 
17 Applications nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, judgment of 14 July 2013. 
18 Bowring supra n. 11. Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) [2005] ECHR 681, Application no. 74025/01, 
Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2005 
19 Butler supra n. 4, at p.9.  
20 Supra, text to n. 5 
21 Bowring supra n. 11. 
22 No. 21-P.  
23 See ‘The Commission’s activities’ available at 
http://venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN.  
24 ‘Interim Opinion on the amendments to the FCL on the CCRF’ available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)005-e  
25 ‘Final Opinion on the Amendments To The Federal Constitutional Law 
On The Constitutional Court’ available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)016-e  
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As the Russian authorities had been unable to host the working group to discuss the 
amendments prior to the March session, the opinion was adopted as an interim one 
and it was agreed that a final opinion would be prepared for the June session.26 
 
Paragraph 13 of the report noted:  
 
The Court [CCRF] considered that it was entitled, as an exceptional case, to disagree 
(with the ECtHR) but that it was ready to search for a lawful compromise within the 
limits of what the Russian constitution allows. The Court pledged to adopt a 
responsible and restrained approach to the solution of the question of the 
implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.27 
 
However, we should also note Paragraph 28: ‘If it is admissible that the question of the 
compatibility with the Constitution of an execution measure of general character be brought 
before the Constitutional Court, the same cannot be said for individual measures, especially 
in case of orders to pay just satisfaction.’28 
The Venice Commission stated in Paragraph 33:  
 
While it seems clear that the Constitutional Court [CCRF] has not spared its efforts to 
avoid a conflict with Strasbourg, which is to be welcomed, the Venice Commission 
maintains its recommendation to remove new Article 1044 paragraph 2 and Article 
106 part 2 of the Federal law on the Constitutional Court.29 
 
In Paragraph 45 in its final Conclusion, the Venice Commission made recommendations to 
render the 2015 amendments compatible with international standards. These 
recommendations have not been taken up Russia. 
 
4 THE YUKOS SHAREHOLDERS’ CLAIM 
 
                                                     
26 Ibid at p. 3. 
27 Ibid at p. 5. 
28 Ibid at p. 9. 
29 Ibid at p. 10. 
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There have been a number of cases brought to the ECtHR as a result of the convictions of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and fellow YUKOS executive Platon Lebedev, and the 
dismemberment of YUKOS as a company.30 Here we will concentrate on one: the claim 
brought by YUKOS shareholders for compensation.  
In 2007 the shareholders had filed a claim with the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in The Hague; in 2009 the PCA agreed to hear the case, and subsequently in July 2014 
ruled in the shareholders favour that ‘Yukos was the object of a series of politically-
motivated attacks by the Russian authorities that eventually led to its destruction’31 and said 
they should receive 50 billion USD compensation, plus 60 million USD as 75 per cent of 
their legal fees. On 20 April 2016 this was overturned on appeal to the Hague District Court, 
to Russia’s relief.32 There may yet be an appeal.33 
But there was another claim, in a different court. The shareholders also approached 
the ECtHR, claiming ECHR breaches, in particular the right to fair trial, in the 2000 Russian 
taxation case against YUKOS. Application was made in 2004 to the ECtHR; by 2009 the 
Court had declared admissibility and eventually heard the case in March 2010. The decision 
handed down in 2011 vindicated the applicants, and time was given for the parties to settle. 
The judgment became final in March 2012 when the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR refused 
further appeal. Eventually, on 31 July 2014 the ECtHR ruled that Russia should pay the 
claimants 1.86 billion euro in compensation and 300,000 euro in court fees.34 This was the 
                                                     
30 For an ‘account of the rise and fall of YUKOS and the fate of its former chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky’ (as 
characterised in a review by M Pieper in Europe-Asia Studies 67 no 4 (2015): 678-679, available at DOI: 
10.1080/09668136.2015.1033192), see R. Sakwa, Putin and the Oligarch. The Khodorkovsky–Yukos Affair 
(London & New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014). For an impressively perceptive summary of events and 
assessment of the ECtHR judgments see L. Groen, ‘The “Iukos Aﬀair”. The Russian Judiciary and the European 
Court of Human Rights’ Review of Central and East European Law 38 (2013): 77-108. 
31 S. Simkin, ‘The Yukos settlement: an insider’s view into the largest arbitration award in history’ 10 March 
2015 Harvard Law Today available at https://today.law.harvard.edu/the-yukos-settlement-an-insiders-view-into-
the-largest-arbitration-award-in-history/.  
32 See S. Shuster, ‘Why a Win in a Dutch Court Is Making Vladimir Putin So Happy’ Time 20 April 2016 
available at http://time.com/4301475/russia-appeal-case-yukos-the-hague/. Details of judgment at 
http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:4230. See also ‘Dutch Court Quashes 
Multibillion-Dollar Award For Yukos Shareholders’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 20 April 2016 available 
at http://www.rferl.org/content/dutch-court-yukos/27685808.html. 
33 See C. Williams, ‘Yukos oil battle flares up 13 years after Putin's Kremlin crushed critic Khodorkovsky’ The 
Telegraph Online (UK) 21 May 2016 available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/21/yukos-oil-
battle-flares-up-13-years-after-putins-kremlin-crushed; C. Stockford, ‘Yukos saga continues as Russia bound by 
provisional application of Energy Charter Treaty’ Lexology 22 Feb. 2017 available at  
 https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=055cd19b-8b4f-476a-8523-a686921222ac; ‘Former Yukos 
Shareholders Give up Claims on Russian Assets in Belgian’ Tass 2 Nov. 2017 available at 
http://tass.com/economy/973950. See also M. Eckel ‘In U.S. Court, Yukos Shareholders Try New Tactic: Go 
After The Lawyers’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 30 June 2017 available at https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-
yukos-arbitration-shareholders-baker-botts-court-ruling/28588682.html.  
34 ‘Russian Justice Ministry ready to ask Constitutional Court to clarify ECHR judgment on Yukos – minister’ 
Interfax Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire 22 Oct. 2015 available through Westlaw. 
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largest award of damages ever made by the ECtHR but substantially less than the 37.98 
billion euro originally claimed, allowing Russia’s deputy justice minister to claim that Russia 
was not a loser in the proceedings.35  
Unsurprisingly, no payment was forthcoming. On 15 June 2015, after Russia had 
missed the deadline to submit a compensation plan to the CoE, the CoE Committee of 
Ministers issued a final reminder. However, also on 15 June 2015 as noted in the previous 
section the group of Duma deputies appealed to the CCRF with a query about the 
constitutionality of Russia applying ECtHR rulings. On 14 July 2015 the CCRF pronounced 
that in principle ECtHR judgments could be enforced in Russia, but only if they did not 
contradict the Russian Constitution. However, this ruling did not specifically address 
YUKOS shareholders’ compensation case. That was left to a later proceeding initiated by the 
Russian Ministry of Justice in October 2016, asking the CCRF to check the constitutionality 
of the ECtHR ruling obliging Russia to pay the nearly 1.9 billion euros to the former YUKOS 
shareholders. Media reported on 11 November 2016 that the CCRF would begin the case on 
15 December.36 The hearing was behind closed doors.37 An amicus brief was submitted by 
the Institute for Law and Public Policy, presented to the Court by a very impressive young 
lawyer, Grigorii Vaipan.38 The CCRF decision was announced on 19 January 2017.39 In the 
meantime, in December 2016 the CoE Committee of Ministers had again called on Russia to 
comply with the ECtHR ruling.40 
Two of the sixteen CCRF judges gave separate opinions, but the majority concluded, 
applying the power discussed in the previous section, that payment of the sum deemed by the 
ECtHR to be due to the former YUKOS shareholders was (constitutionally) ‘impossible’. The 
main justifications were that the CCRF had earlier deemed the prosecution of YUKOS for tax 
evasion was constitutional (because the Court decided that the statute of limitations did not 
apply to wrongdoers); in the historical context of the economic uncertainty of 1990s it was 
                                                     
35 ‘Russia no loser in Europe's Yukos case - deputy justice minister’ Itar-Tass World Service 22 Oct. 2015 
available through Westlaw. 
36 ‘Russia's Constitutional Court to consider implementing ECHR decision on Yukos case’ Itar-Tass 11 Nov. 
2016 available through Westlaw. 
37 ‘Russian Constitutional Court completes hearings on Yukos, judgment to be elaborate at meeting behind 
closed doors – chairman’ Interfax Russia & CIS General Newswire 15 Dec. 2016 available through Westlaw. 
38 See his presentation to the CCRF (in Russian) at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pxX46p2Xuqc&feature=youtu.be&t=3h28s, and the ILPP reports for 15 
December 2016 available at http://ilpp.ru/en/news/events/2016/12/15/events_703.html and 19 January 2017 
available at http://ilpp.ru/en/news/events/2017/01/19/events_718.html.  
39 For thorough comment and assessment, see Bowring supra n. 11. 
40 ‘Council of Europe calls on Russia to comply with 1.9 ruling in favor of YUKOS’ Financial Services Monitor 
Worldwide 10 Dec. 2016 available through Westlaw. 
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correct that the Russian government should seek to ensure fair tax payments; and YUKOS 
had acted in bad faith and should have foreseen the government actions to recoup the tax. 
Giving just compensation to the former shareholders in what was seen by the CCRF to be a 
tax avoidance scheme would be unconstitutional and therefore not possible.41  
The two dissents in part drew on the amicus brief mentioned above. Judge Vladimir 
Yaroslavtsev, a serial dissenter,42 asserted the CCRF contradicted the principle of legality and 
had exceeded its competence.43 Judge Aranovskii was scathing of the Court’s reasoning, and 
‘Like Vladimir Yaroslavtsev, Judge Aranovskii considers it “inadmissible” to consider the 
request of the Ministry of Justice in the Constitutional Court about the possibility not to 
comply with the ECHR decision in the YUKOS case.’44 He also concluded that as the ECtHR 
had not named those to whom money was owed, there was no one to whom compensation 
should be paid.45  
The CCRF’s decision obviously pleased the Russian authorities, and fitted in with the 
general mood of Russia wanting to assert its sovereignty and exceptionalism.46 The CoE did 
not give up hope that nevertheless there would be some payment; on 13 March Anna 
Pushkarskaya reported in Kommersant that; 
 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has criticised Russia for non-
fulfillment of the ECHR [ECtHR] rulings on the Yukos case, particularly, the 
Constitutional Court ruling allowing the Russian authorities not to pay 1.9bn-euro 
compensation to former Yukos shareholders. The Committee of Ministers expects 
Russia to compensate at least legal costs to Yukos representatives.47  
 
This has not happened, and through 2017 the relationship between Russia and the CoE has 
deteriorated.  
                                                     
41 See M. Timofeyev, ‘Money Makes the Court Go Round: The Russian Constitutional Court’s Yukos 
Judgment’ 26 Jan. 2017 cited in Bowring supra n. 10 and available at  
http://verfassungsblog.de/money-makes-the-court-go-round-the-russian-constitutional-courts-yukos-judgment/.  
42 See J. Henderson, ‘Tenure and Discipline Developments in Russia’ European Public Law 17, no. 1 (2011): 1–
10 at p. 2 for an earlier example of Iaroslavtsev speaking out.  
43 See A. Pushkarskaya, ‘V dele IuKOSa poiaviloc’ osoboe mnenie’ Kommersant 23 Jan. 2017, p. 3 available at 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3200190.  
44 A. Pushkarskaya, ‘Rossia mogla ne platit’ i bez sanktsii KS opublikovano btoroe osoboe mnenie po delu 
IuKOSa’ Kommersant 26 Jan. 2017 available at https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3201542.  
45 Ibid. 
46 See e.g. M. Antonov, ‘Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights’ Review of Central and East 
European Law 39 (2014): 1-40. 
47 ‘Council of Europe criticises Russia over Yukos’ BBC Monitoring Summary of Russian Press 13 March 2017. 
available through Westlaw.  
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5 RUSSIA AND THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PACE)  
 
In June 2017 it was reported on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov had told the CoE Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland in a telephone 
conversation that Russia had decided to suspend payment of the final third of Russia’s 
contribution to the 2017 CoE budget.48 The sum involved is 11 million euros.49 Russia, along 
with France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Turkey, is one of the main contributors to the 
Council of Europe’s budget, which covers the cost of PACE, the Committee of Ministers, the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the ECtHR. The total amount of 
contributions to the CoE was given as 260 million euros annually, of which Russia normally 
accounted for about 10 per cent.50 Media reported the speaker of the State Duma Viacheslav 
Volodin asserting that Russia’s refusal to pay was in response to anti-Russian sanctions, and 
the withheld instalment would be paid once the rights of Russia’s PACE delegates were fully 
restored.51  
The ‘anti-Russian’ sanctions referred to here were imposed by PACE on Russia 
following Russia’s inclusion of Crimea in 2014.52 A resolution was adopted condemning 
Russia’s actions, which were described by PACE as an annexation, and in January 2015 the 
Russian delegation to PACE had its voting rights suspended (not for the first time).  
In contrast, RT53 reported that Valentina Matvienko, the speaker of the upper chamber 
of the legislature, the Federation Council: 
 
                                                     
48 ‘Rossiia priostanovila uplatu vznosa v biudzhet Soveta Evropy’ ONK.RF I June 2017 available at 
http://onk.su/news/5276.html; ‘Rosssiia priostanobila uplatu vznosa v biudzhet Soveta Evropy’ Kommersant 30 
June 2017 available at https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3341549. 
49 M. Ozerova, ‘Russia wants to punish PACE with rouble’ Moskovsky Komsomolets BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union Summary of Russian press for 7 June 2017, available via Westlaw, reported that according to State 
Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, Russia has decided not to pay the third part of the 2017 PACE membership 
fee worth about 11m euros. Meanwhile, the PACE has claimed not to have received an official note about it 
from the Russian authorities. 
50 E. Grobman, ‘Rossiia ostavila Sovet Evropy bez chlenskogo bznosa’ Kommersant 6 June 2017 available at 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3318820. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For a detailed critique, see A Jonsson Cornell, ‘Russia’s Annexation of Crimea – a Violation of Russian 
Constitutional Law?’ The Uppsala Yearbook of Eurasian Studies I (2016): 263-8. 
53 Formally Russia Today, widely seen as a source of pro-Russia propaganda; see B. Nimmo, ‘Question That: 
RT’s Military Mission’ AtlanticCouncil's Digital Forensic Research Lab 7 Jan. 2018 available at 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/question-that-rts-military-mission-4c4bd9f72c88. 
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emphasized that the ongoing spat between Russia and PACE was not about one 
particular conflict or incident, but over the general rules of granting or restraining the 
rights of national delegations. 
 
‘No one has the right to restrict the powers of any national delegation, because its 
representatives are elected by the citizens of their country and then delegated to 
PACE in order to represent their nation.’54 
 
Matvienko is clearly trying to give a legalistic spin to what appears to everyone else to be a 
‘tit-for-tat’ response to PACE—and the ECtHR. As a Reuters report in June 2017 noted, 
‘Moscow has also been angered by a number of rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights …The court said last year that Moscow had violated the European Convention in all 
but six of its 228 judgments in Russian cases.’55  
 
7 CONCLUSION 
 
This brief rapport has omitted discussion of many other areas where the ECtHR has recently 
criticised Russia, for example in relation to fairness of the elections;56 gay rights;57 the 
conviction of anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny;58 and of Bolotnaia Square protester 
Nikolai Kavkazsky,59 to name but a few. There is now discussion of the serious (and 
unwelcome) possibility that Russia will withdraw—or be expelled—from the Council of 
Europe. Sadly, relations are so strained that as Russian lawyer Karinna Moskalenko 
commented in October 2017, ‘Expelling us from the Council of Europe means depriving 
                                                     
54 ‘Russia to resume Euro council payments only if ‘discrimination’ ends – senior senator’ RT 3 July 2017 
available at https://www.rt.com/politics/395122-russia-to-resume-payments-to/. 
55 J. Stubbs, A. Osborn & D. Solovyov, ‘Russia suspends payments to Council of Europe over Crimea row’ 
Reuters 30 June 2017 available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-council-of-europe-payments-
idUSKBN19L23A?il=0.  
56 V Kara-Murza, ‘Russia’s Election Was Rigged—And This Time It’s Official’ World Affairs 6 June 2017 
available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/vladimir-kara-murza/russia%E2%80%99s-election-was-
rigged%E2%80%94and-time-it%E2%80%99s-official.  
57 T. Batchelor, ‘European court rules Russia’s “gay propaganda” law encourages homophobia’ Independent 
Online (UK) 21 June 2017 available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-gay-
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